Globally, increases in port loading and unloading fees are often a direct response to rising costs, escalating inflation, and reshaping the competitive landscape. However, looking at Chinese ports—while investments in green and intelligent technologies are constantly increasing, and labor costs are rising, loading and unloading fees have not increased accordingly; instead, they are often listed as a top priority for fee reductions.

Chinese ports are the "first to bear the brunt"

In 2024, the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued the "Action Plan for Effectively Reducing Logistics Costs Across Society," explicitly stating that logistics costs should be considered an important control item for economic operations.

Break it down: in the entire logistics chain, from cargo owners to trucking companies, and then to ports and shipping companies, cargo owners are the main players in foreign trade exports, trucking companies are individuals with meager profits, and most shipping companies are foreign-owned enterprises, making them almost impossible to be included in the control scope. Ports, as state-owned enterprises, and port loading and unloading fees, as a link in the logistics chain, are perceived by outsiders as having a natural monopoly. Listed companies in these ports are highly profitable, so every time fee reductions are mentioned, the port industry is always the "first to be hurt." In 2017, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) conducted a targeted anti-monopoly review of ports, followed by a round of fee reductions at coastal ports.

However, two misconceptions exist: first, ports are a monopolistic industry; second, high port profitability implies high fees.

The starting point for loading and unloading fees is not high.

Taking Shanghai Port, the world's largest container port, as an example, the loading and unloading fee for a 20-foot container is only 528 yuan, and for a 40-foot container, it is 792 yuan. In actual settlements with shipping companies, discounts are involved, meaning the final recorded loading and unloading fee will inevitably be lower than the published price. Except for Yantian International Container Terminal, other coastal ports are basically in the same fee range as Shanghai Port.

Looking at the world, apart from emerging Southeast Asian regions with lower fees, more mature markets such as Hong Kong, Busan, and Jebel Ali have higher loading and unloading fees than Chinese ports, while the US port market is in a completely different league. Taking Maersk Elizabeth Terminal as an example, container handling fees were $921/TEU in 2024, rising to $1079/TEU in 2025, representing a 17% increase within a year. For overseas port operators, regular annual rate adjustments in line with rising costs and inflation to offset operating expenses are standard practice.

Why are Chinese ports unable to raise rates?

Besides the fact that handling fees are relatively low globally, Chinese ports do not possess a natural monopoly, as is the case with the five major port clusters.

In the Bohai Rim port cluster, Dalian, Tianjin, and Qingdao ports all have overlapping hinterlands, allowing cargo owners to freely choose their shipping ports. In the Yangtze River Delta region, Shanghai and Ningbo-Zhoushan ports boast the most concentrated ocean liner routes. In the Pearl River Delta port cluster, there is competition within Shenzhen alone between Yantian and Shekou ports, and the ports of Guangzhou and Hong Kong are also included, creating a highly competitive market environment.

Even with low loading and unloading fees and a highly competitive market environment across port clusters, maintaining a pattern of regular fee increases is a difficult path for Chinese ports to replicate. Haozhan believes that Chinese ports currently lack the space for significant increases in loading and unloading fees.

Firstly, as mentioned above, reducing logistics costs has become a social consensus. On the one hand, the government hopes to support manufacturing and foreign trade enterprises by lowering logistics costs; on the other hand, raising loading and unloading fees too quickly or too high could be interpreted as "logistics costs forcing industry forward," thus attracting regulatory attention.

Secondly, port loading and unloading fees are subject to "market-regulated pricing," and competition remains fierce. In terms of the nature of the charges, port operation packages and other loading and unloading fees fall under the category of "market-regulated pricing." This means that although not directly priced by the government, port companies still need to consider market supply and demand, customer bargaining power, and the competitive landscape.

This implies that if one port raises its loading and unloading fees, another port may engage in a price war to grab container volume, creating a dilemma between profit and volume. The consolidation of provincial port groups has reduced competition between adjacent ports, but it has spurred competition in container volume and shipping routes among these groups, effectively diminishing the courage and scope for ports to raise prices.

Once traffic shifts, the losses for ports may far outweigh the "per-container gain from price increases." Therefore, many ports prefer to maintain stable rates, or even engage in price wars to reduce costs, rather than risk losing traffic.

Price increases also need a "justifiable reason."

In 2021, amidst the booming shipping industry, Ningbo-Zhoushan Port Group was the first to announce a 10% increase in loading and unloading fees. Subsequently, Shanghai Port, Xiamen Port, and Qingdao Port followed suit, indicating that price increases are not a "no-go zone." However, the extent and frequency of these price increases were limited, reflecting a compressed path for price hikes. This means that for ports to raise prices in the future, several prerequisites must be met: first, the port must possess unique service capabilities or a strong market position; second, customer migration must be difficult; and third, the policy environment must be supportive, with the government allowing for moderate price increases.

Haozhan believes that while the stagnation of loading and unloading fees is a pessimistic reality, there are other possibilities: perhaps the future focus of port competition will shift from "loading and unloading rates" to "service value." In other words, ports can no longer rely solely on "charging more per container," but rather enhance their bargaining power, reduce price competition between individual ports, and provide differentiated services by integrating resources within port clusters, achieving integrated collection and distribution, and binding themselves with inland logistics and supply chain services.